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This paper assesses whether short-lived jobs (lasting one quarter or less and involuntarily 
ending in unemployment) are stepping stones to long-lasting jobs (enduring one year or more) 
for Belgian long-term unemployed school-leavers. We proceed in two steps. First, we 
estimate labour market trajectories in a multi-spell duration model that incorporates lagged 
duration and lagged occurrence dependence. Second, in a simulation we find that (fe)male 
school-leavers accepting a short-lived job are, within two years, 13.4 (9.5) percentage points 
more likely to find a long-lasting job than in the counterfactual in which they reject short-
lived jobs. 
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Since the end of the 1980s, labour market regulations on temporary employment have
been eased in many OECD countries, amongst which Belgium,1 while leaving labour
market protection for open-ended employment hardly affected (OECD, 2004b). Re-
search suggests that disadvantaged groups, such as youth, women, and long-term un-
employed, excludedfromemploymentbytoostrictregulations, maybeneﬁtmostfrom
this enhanced ﬂexibility.
There is, however, a debate on whether the increased availability of temporary
jobs facilitates the integration of these disadvantaged groups in regular stable employ-
ment or, in contrast, spurs the development of a secondary labour market, in which
especially the most vulnerable of these disadvantaged workers get trapped in a cycle
between temporary dead-end jobs and unemployment. This article aims at providing
more insights on this debate by analysing the labour market transitions of long-term
unemployed school-leavers in Belgium.
Economic theory provides ambiguous predictions with respect to this debate. On
the one hand, accepting a short-term position may signal low ambition or skills re-
ducing thereby the chances of conversion to a stable position. On the other hand, by
accepting a short-term job a worker could also signal her motivation, acquire access
to informal networks, and avoid deterioration of human capital, facilitating thereby
the search for a longer lasting job. In addition, to the extent that the temporary posi-
tion lasts long enough, a worker can acquire skills that may be useful in subsequent
employment relationships.
The degree to which permanent employment is protected may also inﬂuence the
stepping stone effect of temporary jobs, but again the theoretical predictions are am-
biguous (Casquel and Cunyat, 2008; Ichino et al., 2008). On the one hand, the higher
are ﬁring costs for permanent jobs, the larger is the scope for using temporary jobs
as a screening device, since ﬁrms attribute greater importance to the assessment of
the quality of workers before locking themselves into a new open-ended employment
relationship. On the other hand, higher ﬁring costs may induce ﬁrms to use temporary
workers as a mere ﬂexibility buffer, if they make it impossible to adjust the number of
regular employees during cyclical downturns.
Empirical evidence is more clearcut, at least if we restrict the analysis to the Euro-
pean labour market.2 Studies in the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, and Belgium
1In 1997 and 2002 restrictions on employment in temporary work agencies were reduced and ﬁxed-
term contracts were made renewable (OECD, 2004b, pp. 119).
2For the US, ﬁndings are mixed. Most studies, based on non-experimental evaluation methods, ﬁnd
that short-term hirings by temporary help agencies lead to longer term employment and higher wages
(e.g. Addison and Surﬁeld, 2006; Andersson et al., 2007; Heinrich et al., 2007). However, based on
an inﬂuential social experiment Autor and Houseman (2005) ﬁnd that temporary help jobs boost short-
term earnings, but these gains are offset by lower earnings, less frequent employment, and potentially
1concludethattemporaryemployment, beitwithinﬁxed-termcontractsorintemporary
help agencies, are stepping stones to permanent employment.3 In Germany, Hagen
(2003) ﬁnds supporting evidence for the stepping stone hypothesis of ﬁxed-term con-
tracts, but Kvasnicka (2008) can neither conﬁrm nor deny this conclusion regarding
employment in temporary help agencies. In contrast, Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2006)
report that in Spain accepting employment in temporary help agencies reduces the
probability of being hired on a permanent basis. This dissonant result may be related
to the fact that the Spanish employment protection legislation for regular employment
is regarded to be one of the strictest in the EU (OECD, 2004b): the use of temporary
workers as a ﬂexibility buffer rather than a screening device seems to dominate in that
case. Finally, in line with this negative ﬁnding, Gagliarducci (2005) and García Pérez
and Muñoz-Bullón (2007) report that in Italy and Spain the conversion rate from tem-
porary to permanent jobs decreases with the number of jobs experienced in the past. It
follows thereby that temporary jobs are more likely to be stepping stones to permanent
positions at the beginning of the career than later on.
The existing empirical studies contain, however, some drawbacks that we try to
address. First, these studies aim at determining whether or not initial job insecurity
leads to more job security later on.4 However, being employed with an open-ended
contract is an imperfect indicator of job security, since it does not guarantee that a
job is effectively long-lasting. This depends on the institutional environment.5 For in-
stance, in Belgium open-ended contracts always start with a trial period during which
an employer can end a contract at low costs.6 For white collar workers this trial period
can last up to six months.7 For blue collar workers the trial period is much shorter
(between 1 and 2 weeks), but their employment protection in open-ended contracts
is also much weaker: maximum 35 days of notice payments if job experience is less
than 5 years, while this is never less than 3 months for white collar workers. In this re-
search we therefore propose to use an alternative measure of job security that is based
on the effective job tenure. In the empirical analysis discussed below, job security is
attained if a worker ﬁnds a job that lasts one year or more.8 We label these jobs as
“long-lasting”.
Another drawback of existing studies is that, depending on the institutional con-
text, ﬁxed-term contracts and employment in temporary work agencies may be rela-
higher welfare recidivism over the next one to two years.
3See Booth et al. (2002), Zijl et al. (2004), Larsson et al. (2005), Berton et al. (2007), Göbel and
Verhofstadt (2008), Ichino et al. (2008), and Picchio (2008).
4Job security is regarded as a central dimension of job quality which the Lisbon European council
set as one of the main goals of the Union’s employment strategy (European Commission, 2001).
5Note that this complicates the comparison of the ﬁndings across countries.
6Maximum 7 days of notice payments.
7The trial period can be up to 12 months for high paid jobs, but this concerns only very few jobs
retained in the analysis below.
8We will justify the choice of this threshold below.
2tively long-lasting. In the late 1990s, most of the OECD countries had no limits on
the maximum duration and number of renewals of temporary jobs (OECD, 1999, § 2).
In Belgium, a worker may conclude maximum four ﬁxed-term contracts of a duration
of minimum 3 months and maximum 2 years (OECD, 2007). As a consequence, the
non-conversion to an open-ended contract is not necessarily identiﬁed with a situation
of precarious employment. In addition, precarious employment is neither identiﬁed
with a situation in which some workers voluntarily choose to cycle between tempo-
rary jobs. To overcome these criticisms, we do not investigate the stepping stone effect
of accepting a short-term employment contract,9 but rather of accepting a “short-lived
job”, i.e. jobs lasting one quarter or less that are involuntarily interrupted.10 By re-
stricting our analysis to short-lived jobs, we aim at estimating a lower bound for the
conversion rate of temporary jobs to long-lasting jobs, taken as a measure of job secu-
rity.11 Moreover, by restricting to very short-lived jobs, we obtain more insight in the
causal mechanism of the conversion rate to long-lasting jobs: signaling or informal
networks are then more likely determinants than human capital formation, since the
latter requires more time.
The estimation of the stepping stone effect of short-lived jobs is realized in two
steps. First, we estimate the complete labour market trajectory of all sampled work-
ers, i.e long-term unemployed school-leavers. Subsequently, we investigate whether
workers who accept a short-lived job (the treatment) are more or less likely to enter
a long-lasting job (the successful outcome) than if they always rejected such jobs and
continued job search until ﬁnding a more stable position. Since the treatment effect
is a complicated function of the estimated parameters, we can only ﬁnd an answer to
this question on the basis of simulations. Moreover, since the treatment effect can be
heterogeneous in terms of observed and unobserved characteristics, we do not only
simulate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), but also the complete dis-
tribution of the individual treatment effects (Heckman et al., 1997).
The credibility of our approach crucially hinges on the realism of the model in the
ﬁrst step. We distinguish between three states: insured unemployment, employment,
and an absorbing censoring state for all remaining states.12 We explicitly model job-
to-job transitions. On the basis of a model similar to ours, estimated on a sample of
Australian school-leavers, Doiron and Gørgens (2008) ﬁnd that labour market transi-
9We cannot identify the type of employment contract in the data.
10We identify an involuntary interruption by one that ends in insured unemployment. In Belgium,
workers are not entitled to unemployment beneﬁts if they voluntarily quit a job.
11To the extent that job-to-job transitions are voluntary, one could argue that we should consider
employment security instead of job security as an indicator of success. However, sticking to an indicator
of job security should provide us with a conservative measure of employment security.
12We model the censoring state as absorbing in order to reduce the dimensionality of the computa-
tional problem. This contrasts with Doiron and Gørgens (2008), who model out of the labour force as
a separate state, but they do not consider job-to-job transitions.
3tions of youth are characterized by a complex form of state dependence, depending
not only on the history in the current labour market state, but also on past history. We
accommodate to these concerns by estimating a mixed proportional hazard (MPH)
model with competing risks of exit, in which we allow the order, the type, and the
duration of the previous spell to proportionally shift the baseline hazards.13 The se-
lection on unobservables is controlled for on the basis of a discrete distribution with
an unknown number of mass points in which the correlation structure is completely
ﬂexible (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Horny and Picchio (2009) prove that all the
parameters of such a model are non-parametrically identiﬁed. Moreover, since in this
empirical application we observe multiple spells, we impose restrictions on the form
of the hazards across spells, and we condition on exogenous time-varying explanatory
variables, we speculate on the basis of the existing literature (Brinch, 2007; Gaure
et al., 2008; Horny and Picchio, 2009) that the model is over-identiﬁed and that the
proportionality assumption is therefore not crucial for identiﬁcation. The estimation
procedure corresponds to the one that Gaure et al. (2007) have validated in extensive
Monte Carlo simulations.
Section 2 describes the data on which the analysis is based. Section 3 discusses
the speciﬁcation of the econometric model. The estimation results are reported and
commented in Section 4. Section 5 describes the simulation on the basis of which
we assess, ﬁrst, the goodness-of-ﬁt of the model and, subsequently, the stepping stone
effect. Section 6 concludes. Details concerning the simulation procedure and further
estimation and simulation results are provided in an internet appendix that can be
downloaded from http://users.ugent.be/~bcockx/Appendix-CPa.pdf.
2 The Data
The empirical analysis is conducted on administrative records gathered by the Cross-
roads Bank for Social Security (CBSS).14 The CBSS merges data from the different
Belgian Social Insurance institutions and allows thereby to construct the quarterly
labour market history of all Belgian workers. As explained in the Introduction, this
research is concerned with disadvantaged youth. The sample contains all Belgian
school-leavers, aged between 18 and 25 years, who, in 1998, were still unemployed
nine months after graduation. In Belgium, after this “waiting period” of nine months,
school-leaversareentitledtounemploymentbeneﬁts(UB)and, asaconsequence, they
13Doiron and Gørgens (2008) specify lagged occurrence and lagged duration dependence as the
cumulative number and duration of spells since ﬁrst entry in the labour force. However, we are not
aware of any identiﬁcation result for such a model.
14See http://www.ksz.fgov.be/En/CBSS.htm.
4show up for the ﬁrst time in the administrative records of the CBSS.15 By sampling
from a population of school-leavers we drastically simplify initial conditions prob-
lems in the analysis of lagged labour market dependence, since nobody in the sample
had any labour market experience prior to the sampling date. Nevertheless, the fact
that all sampled individuals have been unemployed for nine months since graduation
does complicate the analysis. We will discuss in Subsection 3.3 how we deal with this
complication.
The eventual sample contains 8,921 women and 6,627 men. The administrative
records allowed us to reconstruct the quarterly (un)employment history of these work-
ers for a period of (maximum) four years, from the beginning of 1998 until the end of
2001. In the analysis we distinguish between three mutually exclusive labour market
states occupied at the end of each quarter: unemployed as UB recipient (u), employed
(e), and an absorbing censoring state (a). This censoring state is accessed if the in-
dividual leaves the labour force, enters a training programme, returns to school, or
is sanctioned and looses her entitlement to UB. We consider ﬁve possible transitions
between these states: (u;e), (u;a), (e;u), (e;a) and, since the data contain a ﬁrm
indicator, job-to-job transitions (e;e).
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the number of observed spells at individual
level. Individuals occupy on average 2.5 different labour market states during the
four year observation window and a maximum of 12. Men are more mobile than
women: 39% of the men in the sample experience at least 3 spells, whereas only 33%
of the women. This multi-spell information is exploited to infer the impact of the
lagged labour market outcomes on the subsequent transition intensities. Figure A-1
in Internet Appendix A-3 reports, by gender, the absolute frequencies of transitions
that are observed in the data. Figure A-2 reports similar ﬁgures but decomposing jobs
according to their duration.
Table 2 displays summary statistics of the explanatory variables contained in the
data. They can be decomposed into three groups: time-invariant covariates ﬁxed at the
sampling date, spell speciﬁc variables ﬁxed at the value attained at the start of the cor-
responding spell, but varying across spells, and time-varying covariates whose values
can change every quarter. The statistics of spell speciﬁc and time-varying explana-
tory variables are reported at the sampling date, except for the ﬁrm characteristics,
which are reported at the start of the ﬁrst job spell. Summary statistics of the values
of the time-varying variables at the beginning of subsequent labour market spells are
reported in Internet Appendix A-3, Table A-1.16
Nationality, region of residence, and education are the time-invariant covariates.
15Note that the entitlement of school-leavers to UB is a-typical, but similar schemes exist in Den-
mark, Greece, Luxembourg, and Czech Republic although usually with stricter eligibility criteria
(OECD, 2004a).
16Tables A-2 and A-3 in the same internet appendix present descriptive statistics of short-lived jobs
and long-lasting jobs, respectively for men and women.
5Table 1: Individual Observations by Number of Observed Spells
and Gender
Male Female
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
# of spells (Unemployment + job spells) frequency(a) frequency(b) frequency(a) frequency(b)
1 6,627 100.0% 8,921 100.0%
2 3,901 58.9% 4,405 49.4%
3 2,552 38.5% 2,917 32.7%
4 1,513 22.8% 1,755 19.7%
5 876 13.2% 1,028 11.5%
6 492 7.4% 577 6.5%
7 265 4.0% 326 3.7%
8 132 2.0% 181 2.0%
9 70 1.1% 95 1.1%
More than 9 49 0.8% 70 0.8%
Total observed spells 16,477 20,275
Average spells per individual 2.49 2.27
Maximum number of individual spells 12 12
(a) Number of individuals in the sample who experience the corresponding number of different
spells.
(b) This frequency is the ratio of the number of individuals who experience the corresponding
number of different spells to the total number of individuals who entered the sample.
Since the sample consists of long-term unemployed, sections of the population with a
high unemployment risk are more represented in the sample than in the population as
a whole: foreigners, low schooled youth and, since the unemployment rate in Flanders
is much lower, those living in Wallonia and Brussels.17 The high share of youth living
in Wallonia is especially striking: roughly two thirds of the sample lives in Wallonia,
whereas only one third of the total Belgian population has its residence in Wallonia.
The set of spell speciﬁc explanatory variables contains age, quarter of entry into
the spell, household position, the monthly amount of unemployment beneﬁts, and a
set of sector and ﬁrm size indicator variables. Two variables are conditioned upon
in the empirical analysis, but not reported in Table 2 since their value is zero at the
sampling date: the length of the previous labour market spell and an indicator for the
previous spell type.
We distinguish between three types of household positions: head of household,
single or cohabitant. These categories determine together with age the level of the
ﬂat UB rate to which the unemployed school-leavers are entitled to after the higher
mentioned waiting period. In 2000, the monthly beneﬁt level varied between 307e for
cohabitants (more than 18 years old) not in charge of other members in the household
and 790e for household heads. The majority of the sampled individuals (79%) is
cohabitant. This reﬂects that most youth is still living in their parents’ home.
School-leavers who worked at least one year during a time window of 18 months
17Belgium is divided into three regions: Flanders, the Flemish-speaking region in the North, Wallo-
nia, the French-speaking region in the South, and Brussels.
6Table 2: Summary Statistics by Gender
Male Female
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Time-invariant covariates
Nationality
Belgian .891 .312 .879 .326
Non-Belgian EU .052 .222 .054 .226
Non EU .057 .232 .067 .250
Education
Primary (6 to 9 years of schooling) .121 .326 .079 .269
Lower secondary (9 to 12 years) .280 .449 .226 .419
Higher secondary (12 to 16 years) .422 .494 .481 .500
Higher education (16 years or more) .126 .332 .173 .378
Other .009 .094 .008 .088
Unknown .042 .201 .033 .178
Region of residence
Flanders .201 .401 .245 .430
Wallonia .674 .469 .641 .480
Brussels .125 .331 .114 .317
Time-variant spell-speciﬁc covariates at sampling date
Age 20.5 1.96 20.4 1.97
Monthly unemployment beneﬁts (in e) 332.9 120.5 344.0 139.0
Quarter of entry
January-February-March .081 .273 .071 .258
April-May-June .660 .474 .689 .463
July-August-September .166 .372 .164 .371
October-November-December .093 .290 .076 .264
Household Position
Head of household .077 .266 .108 .311
Single .134 .341 .101 .302
Cohabitant .789 .408 .791 .407
Firm size(a)
[1;20) employees .272 .445 .254 .435
[20;50) employees .063 .243 .071 .257
[50;100) employees .044 .205 .044 .205
[100;500) employees .135 .342 .142 .349
500 or more employees .486 .500 .489 .500
Sector(a)
Agriculture .029 .168 .018 .133
Industry & Mining .086 .281 .039 .193
Building & Energy .082 .274 .011 .103
Wholesale & Retail trade .164 .370 .183 .387
Credit & Insurance .014 .119 .017 .130
Business services .420 .494 .343 .475
Other services & Public admin. .205 .403 .390 .488
Time-variant covariates at sampling date
Local unemployment rate .184 .069 .269 .085
Observations 6,627 8,921
(a) Sector and ﬁrm size ﬁgures refer to the start of the ﬁrst job spell.
7become entitled to higher UB if they are laid off.18 There are some workers in the
sample who receive these higher UB when they experience a subsequent unemploy-
ment spell. In order to account for the adverse incentive effects related to these higher
UB, we explicitly included the monthly UB level as an explanatory variable. In addi-
tion, we explicitly take into account that, if one is not the head of the household, these
higher UB drop to a lower level after one year. As a consequence, to the extent that
this drop is anticipated, this affects the proﬁle of the duration dependence of the transi-
tion rate from unemployment. Following Meyer (1990), we explicitly control for this
by including, for those individuals who can suffer UB drops (the dummy declining
beneﬁts), four time-varying indicator variables (not reported in Table 2). If  denotes
the number of quarters remaining before beneﬁts fall to a lower level, we deﬁne these
variables as follows: UI 1 = 1 if  = 1, and 0 otherwise; UI 2 = 1 if   2, and 0
otherwise; UI 3 = 1 if   3, and 0 otherwise; UI 4 = 1 if   4, and 0 otherwise.
In the empirical analysis below, the coefﬁcient of UI 1 captures the marginal effect
of going from 2 quarters to 1 quarter before the beneﬁt drop. The coefﬁcients of the
other variables have a similar interpretation.
The ﬁrm size indicators are created on the basis of the number of employees in
the reference worker’s ﬁrm. We distinguish between ﬁve ﬁrm size types. Almost one
half of the subsample of those who ﬁnd a job are employed in large ﬁrms and more
than one quarter in small ﬁrms. On the basis of the NACE nomenclature19 and a 2-
digit information, we distinguish between seven ﬁrm sectors. Most of the workers
is employed in “Business services”. This sector comprises several types of services
provided to ﬁrms: cleaning, call-centre activities, labour recruitment, counselling,
advertising, and accounting. The data do not allow to further decompose this sectoral
information.
Finally, in order to take into account the state of the labour market, the local unem-
ployment rate is modelled as a time-varying explanatory variable. Since in Belgium
no statistic exists on the local unemployment rate following the standard ILO deﬁ-
nition, we rely on a non-standard statistic provided by the Belgian Unemployment
Agency (ONEM). This statistic reports the fraction of the population insured against
the risk of unemployment (thereby excluding civil servants) which is entitled to UB.
This usually results in a higher unemployment rate than the one obtained with the ILO
deﬁnition. At the sampling date in 1998, the average local unemployment rate for
men and women is 18.4% and 26.9%, compared to 7.7% and 11.6% according to the
standard ILO deﬁnition (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).
18See http://www.onem.be for more details.
19See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases_old/index/nace_all.html for a detailed
list of NACE codes.
83 The Econometric Model
In the Introduction we announced that the analysis is conducted in two steps. In a
ﬁrst step we estimate a multi-state multi-spell duration model in which the nature and
the duration of the labour market state occupied in the past are allowed to inﬂuence
the duration of stay in the current state. In a second step (Section 5), we run a mi-
crosimulation exercise on this econometric model to identify whether short-lived jobs
are stepping stones to long-lasting jobs.
This section focuses on econometric issues of the ﬁrst step, makes the model spec-
iﬁcation explicit, discusses the identiﬁcation of the structural parameters of interest,
and elucidates the main steps in the construction of the likelihood function.
3.1 The Speciﬁcation of Transition Intensities
Since we only observe the labour market state occupied at the end of each quarter,
the observed data are grouped in discrete time intervals. To avoid the dependency of
parameters to the time unit of observation (Flinn and Heckman, 1982), we follow van
den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001) and specify the discrete-time process as in a
grouped continuous-time model. If s = 1;:::;S denotes the spell order, counting the
number of times a particular labour market state (u or e) is occupied, the transition
intensity in spell s from the origin state j to the destination state k is denoted by s
jk,
with the ordered pair (j;k) 2 Z = f(u;e);(u;a);(e;e);(e;u); (e;a)g. During spell
s started at time s (with s 2 N0) and after ts quarters in state j (with ts 2 N0), the
transition intensity from j to k is speciﬁed in the following MPH form:

s









for (j;k) 2 Z , where exp[jk(ts)] is the piecewise constant baseline hazard captur-
ing the duration dependence; vs
jk is the spell- and transition-speciﬁc individual het-
erogeneity, a positive random number; xjk(s + ts) is a Kjk dimensional vector of
time-invariant and time-variant covariates controlling for observed heterogeneity at
the transition quarter (s + ts) and including the length and type (unemployed or not)
of the preceding labour market spell. The associated and conformable parameter vec-
tor to be estimated is jk.
We impose in (1) that jk(ts) and jk are ﬁxed across spells. This is not required
for identiﬁcation (Horny and Picchio, 2009), but it reduces the computational burden,
increases the precision of the parameter estimates and, by imposing more structure,
identiﬁcation will intuitively depend less on the MPH speciﬁcation. We restrict the
speciﬁcation even further in that the order s of the spell just shifts the baseline transi-
tion intensity proportionally across subsequent spells or even not at all if the absorbing
9censoring state (a) is the destination:20
(i) vs
ja = vja for j = u;e and s = 1;:::;S;
(ii) vs
jk = vjkcs
jk, for (j;k) 2 f(u;e);(e;e);(e;u)g, where cs
jk = c3
jk for s =
4;:::;S. The scaling factors c1
jk are normalized to 1 for each (j;k) 2 f(u;e);
(e;e);(e;u)g.
To avoid parametric assumptions on the distribution of the unobserved hetero-
geneity, we follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and assume that the vector v 
[vue;vua;vee;veu;vea] is a random draw from a discrete distribution function with a
ﬁnite and (a priori) unknown number M of support points. The probabilities associ-
ated to the mass points sum to one and, 8 m = 1;:::;M, are denoted by
pm=Pr(vue=vuem;vua=vuam;vee=veem;veu=veum;vea=veam)Pr(v = vm)





with m = 1;:::;M and M = 0:
A pre-speciﬁed low number of support points may result in substantial bias. We there-
fore choose, as suggested by Gaure et al.’s (2007) Monte Carlo simulations, the M
number of support points to minimize the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
3.2 Identiﬁcation
In order to determine the stepping stone effect of short-lived jobs we must have a
model that credibly identiﬁes the causal impact of the labour market history on the
current labour market trajectory. The determination of this causal impact crucially de-
pends on the capacity to control for sources of endogeneity. We attempt to control for
four sources of endogeneity: (i) unobserved heterogeneity; (ii) endogenous censoring;
(iii) endogeneity induced by time-varying variables; (iv) initial conditions.
It is well known that the failure to control for (un)observed individual characteris-
tics leads to inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters of interest, in particu-
lar of the baseline hazard and the lagged occurrence and lagged duration dependence.
The selection on unobservables is controlled for on the basis of a discrete distribution
with an unknown number of mass points in which the correlation structure is com-
pletely ﬂexible (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Horny and Picchio (2009) prove that, if
one imposes the MPH structure, the heterogeneity distribution is non-parametrically
identiﬁed together with the structural parameters of the model, including the lagged
20Notethat, bywayofthisfactorofproportionalityandthetype(unemployedornot)ofthepreceding
labour market spell, we specify lagged occurrence dependence.
10occurrence and lagged duration dependence.21 Moreover, since in this empirical ap-
plication we observe multiple spells, we impose restrictions on the speciﬁcation of
the hazard across spells,22 and we condition on exogenous time-varying explanatory
variables, we speculate on the basis of the existing literature (Brinch, 2007; Gaure et
al., 2008; Horny and Picchio, 2009)23 that the model is over-identiﬁed and that iden-
tiﬁcation is therefore not only achieved by the proportionality assumption. A concern
nevertheless remains, since the higher mentioned identiﬁcation result assumes that the
data are measured in continuous time, whereas our data are quarterly. Gaure et al.
(2007) however report from an extensive Monte Carlo analysis24 that, in practice, the
discrete-time measurement still allows to robustly recover the true structural parame-
ters from the observed data, to the extent that the discreteness of data measurement is
explicitly taken into account in setting up the likelihood function. This is what we do
in Section 3.3.
We focus on the transitions between two labour market states: unemployment (u)
and employment in the same ﬁrm (e). However, as pointed out by van den Berg et al.
(1994) and van den Berg and Lindeboom (1998), if there are unobserved character-
istics affecting both the labour market transitions of interest ((u;e), (e;u) and (e;e))
and the transitions to other destinations, this may lead to inconsistent estimates of the
parameters determining the transitions of interest. This is why we explicitly specify an
absorbing censoring state (a) the transitions to which ((u;a) and (e;a)) may depend
on unobserved variables that are correlated with the other unobservables.
In the two preceding points we discussed how we can correct for the selectivity
bias induced by time-constant determinants of the labour market transitions. Event
history models can, however, also easily take time-varying factors of transitions into
account if their time-path is observed. In the previous section we discussed which
time-varying variables we condition upon in the analysis and why.
Aﬁnalpointofconcernistheinitialconditionsproblemcommonindynamicmod-
els with lagged dependent variables. In general, the probability of being observed in
the labour market state occupied at the sampling date is determined by the history of
labour market transitions before this date. Since this history is typically not observed,
it is usually difﬁcult to derive the correct expression for this probability, unless one
21The proof is an extension of those given by Honoré (1993), Omori (1998), and Abbring and van
den Berg (2003a).
22The model would be identiﬁed even if all transition intensities were spell-speciﬁc. We only allow
for a proportional shift across spells.
23See also Bhargava (1991) and Mroz and Savage (2006) who discuss how the time-variation of
exogenous variables helps identifying the causal impacts of endogenous variables in dynamic discrete
time panel data models.
24To our knowledge only Ridder (1990) explicitly treats the identiﬁcation of grouped data, but only in
a single-spell and single-risk framework. With discrete duration data, a sufﬁcient additional condition
for identiﬁcation is the presence of at least one continuous covariate that spans the whole set of real
numbers, instead of one covariate taking on only two values in the continuous case.
11makes strong assumptions, such as stationarity. Moreover, since this probability is,
in general, a function of the parameters of interest, its misspeciﬁcation is a source of
bias. Here this problem is however simpliﬁed, since we know that all sampled individ-
uals entered the labour force nine months before the sampling date. The probability
of being observed at the sampling date is therefore given by the joint probability of
entering unemployment after graduation and remaining unemployed during the sub-
sequent three quarters. The only parameters of interest involved in this expression are
therefore those determining the transition rate from unemployment and not those from
employment. The initial conditions problem therefore boils down to a left censoring
problem in a single spell framework.
We compare two solutions to this problem: the conditional likelihood approach
proposedbyRidder(1984)andtheapproximatesolutionsuggestedbyHeckman(1981)
for dynamic discrete choice models implemented by Gritz (1993) in a duration model.
We prefer these approaches to the more efﬁcient method followed by Flinn and Heck-
man (1982), since they are more robust by not requiring the strong assumptions that
the economic environment is stationary and in equilibrium. Heckman’s (1981) solu-
tion is more ﬂexible than Ridder’s (1984), but we prefer the latter to the former, since
in Heckman’s (1981) approach one looses the structural interpretation of the parame-
ters regarding the ﬁrst transition from unemployment and, hence, these are no longer
comparable to the second transition from unemployment. This choice is justiﬁed on
the basis of a Vuong (1989) likelihood ratio test of strictly non-nested models: neither
model can be rejected against the other according to this test. We will show below in
more details how these initial conditions modify the likelihood function.
3.3 The Likelihood Function
In the derivation of the likelihood we ﬁrst ignore the initial conditions problem and
assume that the sample is drawn at the start of the unemployment spell right after
graduation. In a second step, we explain what we should modify to take into account
that all workers are already three quarters unemployed at the sampling date.
We start with the derivation of the individual contributions of each spell to the like-
lihood function. As mentioned in the previous section, we explicitly take into account
that the data are measured in discrete time. The contribution of a spell s with origin
state j that is incomplete because right censored at the end of the observation period



















12where J = E  f(e;e);(e;u);(e;a)g if j = e and J = U  f(u;e);(u;a)g if
j = u, j is the set of parameters if the origin state is j, and xj and vs
j collect the
xjk(s + ts)’s and the vs
jk’s with (j;k) 2 J.
Using the same notation, the contribution to the likelihood function of a complete





















Conditional on the unobserved covariates, individual i’s contribution to the like-
lihood function is given by the product over the individual i’s single spell contribu-
tions. Let Li(tijxi;v;) denote this product, where ti collects all the individual i’s
labour market durations and xi and v the associated set of observed and unobserved
covariates. Integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity v on the basis of the above-






The log-likelihood function sums the logarithm of this expression over all the individ-
uals in the sample.
We now turn to the modiﬁcation required to deal with the initial conditions prob-
lem. Ridder (1984) considers the likelihood conditional on being observed at the sam-
pling date. The probability of being observed at the sampling date is given by the joint
probability of entering unemployment after graduation and remaining unemployed
during the subsequent three quarters. The probability of entering unemployment can,
however, be ignored if we assume that it is proportional in observed and unobserved
characteristics. The required modiﬁcation is therefore just a division of the individ-
ual contribution in (4) by the probability of surviving three quarters in unemployment








The correction for initial conditions is carried out by the presence of Su in the nu-
merator and denominator of (5): it corrects for different unobserved propensities to
leave among different subpopulations and ensures thereby that, conditional on this
differential sorting, the impact of observed characteristics remains proportional with
13duration.
Heckman’s (1981) solution to the initial conditions boils down to constructing the
likelihoodonthebasisofindividualcontributionsoftheformexpressedin(4)inwhich
the parameters of the transition intensities from the ﬁrst unemployment spell, 1
ue and
1
ua, are no longer constrained to be equal to those from the subsequent unemployment
spells.25 The drawback of this approach is that the estimated transitions from the ﬁrst
unemployment spell do not therefore have a structural interpretation, since they are
biased by the stock sampling.
4 Estimation Results
We focus the discussion of the estimation results on those factors that matter for the
determination of the stepping stone effect of short-lived jobs: current duration de-
pendence and lagged occurrence and duration dependence related to the transitions
between the two labour market states of interest: u and e. Since the parameters de-
termining the transition intensities to the absorbing censoring state a are not of direct
interest, they are reported in the internet appendix.
The main results discussed in this section are based on the model which uses Rid-
der’s (1984) correction for initial conditions. On the basis of a Vuong (1989) test,
modiﬁed to permit AIC log-likelihood penalties, we cannot reject this benchmark
model against the one based on Heckman’s (1981) approach at a p-value of 0.305
for men and 0.140 for women. Moreover, as it can be veriﬁed in Table A-13 in Inter-
net Appendix A-3, the parameter estimates of interest regarding the lagged duration
and occurrence dependence are in line with those of the benchmark model.
The model we report here is one in which dependence on lagged duration is spec-
iﬁed log-linearly. In a robustness analysis we also allowed this dependence to be
piecewise continuous with two knots, the ﬁrst one at two quarters and the second one
at one year of lagged duration. We could not reject the null hypothesis of a constant
slope, both for men and women.26
4.1 Current Duration Dependence
Figure 1 displays the patterns of the duration dependence of three transition rates:
(u;e), (e;e) and (e;u).27 The baseline transition from unemployment to employment,
reported in the upper panel, exhibits strong negative duration dependence up to the
7th quarter and is roughly constant thereafter. This contrasts with the results of Cockx
25Note that the baseline transition intensities of the ﬁrst three quarters are not identiﬁed, since no-one
in the sample leaves unemployment within the ﬁrst three quarters.
26The p-values are 0.877 for men and 0.120 for women.
27The point estimates and standard errors are reported in Table A-4 in Internet Appendix A-3.
14and Dejemeppe (2005), who cannot reject for young men aged 28 years or younger a
constant proﬁle of the baseline hazard rate from unemployment. However, this ﬁnding
could follow from their incapacity to distinguish between transitions to employment
and to other destinations: even if parameter estimates are not very precise, Table A-4
in Internet Appendix A-3 reports that the baseline transition rate to the absorbing cen-
soring state a is, if anything, increasing with unemployment duration. This negative
duration dependence can be caused by a number of factors: loss of skills (Pissarides,
1992), stigma effects (Vishwanath, 1989; Jackman and Layard, 1991) or a hiring strat-
egy in which workers are ranked according to unemployment duration (Lockwood,
1991; Blanchard and Diamond, 1994).
Figure 1: Estimated Baseline Hazards by Gender
The bottom panels of Figure 1 depict the duration proﬁles of (e;e) and (e;u) tran-
15sition intensities. Both display that the job separation rate declines with tenure, a
ﬁnding that is consistent with the central facts about working mobility (e.g. Topel and
Ward, 1992; Farber, 1999). The spike in the fourth quarter is probably related to the
non-renewal of temporary contracts. The transition rate to unemployment declines
more and much faster than the job-to-job transitions. It stabilizes after 5 quarters,
whereas the job-to-job transitions continue to decline gradually. This means that dis-
missals essentially occur during the ﬁrst year, whereas job changes are spread out over
a longer time span. The evidence of the spikes and of dismissals essentially occurring
during the ﬁrst year supports our deﬁnition of long-lasting jobs as jobs lasting one
year or more.
4.2 Lagged Occurrence and Lagged Duration Dependence
We now discuss the inﬂuence of lagged occurrence and lagged duration dependence
in details. These estimation results are reported in Table 3.
Lagged Unemployment Dependence
First, do the lagged occurrence and lagged duration of unemployment generate any
scarring effect (Arulampalam et al., 2001; Gregg, 2001)? The occurrence of unem-
ployment may indeed signal low productivity, making employers more reluctant to
hire and more inclined to dismissed workers (Gibbons and Katz, 1991).28 This scar-
ring effect may exacerbate with unemployment duration if skills depreciate progres-
sively throughout the unemployment spell.29 In contrast, Burdett (1979) and Mari-
mon and Zilibotti (1999) argue that a longer job search may improve the quality of the
match, dissolving less rapidly as a consequence.
According to the empirical ﬁndings regarding lagged duration dependence, it is
the second effect that dominates. For women, increasing the length of the previous
unemployment spell by one quarter reduces the transition intensity from employment
to unemployment by 3% and the job-to-job transition intensity by 4%. For men, only
the job-to-job transition rate falls signiﬁcantly by 3% per quarter of unemployment.
Therefore, if unemployment imposes a scar, it is related to its occurrence, not to
its duration. In addition, the past occurrence of unemployment imposes a scar only
by raising the transition rate from employment to unemployment, not by affecting
28Given that company closures are exogenous no such inference can be made when displacement is
caused by a workplace closure. However, our data do not allow to distinguish between the reasons of
displacement.
29Note that the threat of beneﬁt exhaustion may be an alternative explanation for the scarring effect
of unemployment duration (Belzil, 2001; Tatsiramos, 2008), but since in Belgium beneﬁt entitlement
is indeﬁnite, this factor is not relevant here.
16job-to-job transition intensities. A young man (woman) who entered a job from un-
employment instead of from another job is 27% (35%) more likely to be dismissed.30
Table 3: The Impact of the Past on Transition Intensities
Transition (u;e) (e;e) (e;u)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Men
Lagged unemployment duration – – -.031** .014 -.019 .013
Previous state: unemployment – – -.146 .100 .237* .130
Lagged job duration -.004 .023 -.028 .023 -.127*** .037
Scaling factors(a) – The lnc1
jks are normalized to zero
lnc2
jk .319*** .102 -.161 .129 -.005 .142
lnc3
jk .532*** .113 -.030 .106 -.362*** .106
# of individuals 6,627 # of spells 16,447
# of parameters 191 Log-likelihood -41,174.1
Women
Lagged unemployment duration – – -.041*** .015 -.030** .012
Previous state: unemployment – – -.017 .104 .302** .120
Lagged job duration -.032* .019 -.042** .020 -.063** .029
Scaling factors(a) – The lnc1
jks are normalized to zero
lnc2
jk .560*** .100 -.044 .124 -.251* .134
lnc3
jk .683*** .109 -.109 .101 -.319*** .094
# of individuals 8,921 # of spells 20,275
# of parameters 197 Log-likelihood -51,269.2
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
(a) The scaling factors cs
jk were introduced in Subsection 3.1. The scaling factors cs
jk for s = 2;3 are
proportional shifts of the corresponding (j;k) transition intensities across subsequent spells, with the
ﬁrst unemployment and job transition intensities as references, i.e. c1
jk = 1. For instance, lnc2
ue is
the shift of the hiring rate after the ﬁrst job with respect to the hiring rate after graduation (lnc1
ue is
normalized to zero); lnc3
ue is the shift of the subsequent hiring rates with respect to the hiring rate
after graduation.
Lagged Job Dependence
The hiring rate increases dramatically with the order of the unemployment spell. As
compared to the hiring rate in the ﬁrst unemployment spell, the hiring rate in the
second unemployment spell is 38% higher for young men and even 75% higher for
young women; in the third and the subsequent unemployment spells the hiring rates
for men and women increase even by 70% and 98%, relative to the ﬁrst spell.31 We
regardthisasevidencethat, forthelabourmarketintegrationoflong-termunemployed
youth, it is essential to acquire work experience, however short. The fact that this
effect is conditional on the duration of the past work experience suggests that there
3027  [exp(:237)   1]  100 and 35  [exp(:302)   1]  100. Note that the effect for men is only
signiﬁcant at 10%.
31These ﬁgures are obtained from the point estimates of lncs
ue for s = 2;3 reported in column (1) of
Table 3 and calculated as in the previous footnote.
17is a signalling mechanism at work: accepting a job could signal higher productivity,
through, e.g., a higher motivation to work. Even if these ﬁndings demonstrate that
the ﬁrst work experience dramatically facilitates the subsequent job ﬁnding, they also
suggest that the positive effect of work experience may fade away as youth acquires
more of it. The hiring rate increases at a decreasing rate: moving from no work
experience to a ﬁrst job boosts the subsequent hiring rate by more than moving from
the ﬁrst job to the second one.
Pastworkexperiencedoesnotonlyhaveastrongpositiveimpactonthehiringrate.
It also reinforces tenure in the subsequent job, at least from the third spell onwards.
A second job does not last signiﬁcantly longer than the ﬁrst one,32 but the expected
duration of each subsequent job is signiﬁcantly higher: even if the job-to-job transition
rate is not affected, the transition rate to unemployment falls by 30% for men and by
27% for women.33
The length of the previous job may affect both the hiring rate and the duration of
the subsequent job. On the one hand, the longer one has been employed in the past,
the more time the worker has had to integrate in informal networks enhancing job
ﬁnding (Ioannides and Loury, 2004) and to acquire transferable skills reinforcing the
willingness of subsequent employers to hire and retain these workers. On the other
hand, the longer a worker has been occupied by the same employer, the more speciﬁc
human capital is lost at lay off. Consequently, the productivity of these workers in a
new job may not match the higher reservation wage that these workers set to avoid
a drop in their earnings (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998). This slows down the re-
employment rate and stimulates on-the-job-search, reinforcing job-to-job transitions.
From Table 3 we infer that the length of the previous job does not affect the transi-
tion rate from unemployment to employment at a signiﬁcance level of 5%. In contrast,
the length of the previous job increases current job duration: increasing lagged job
tenure by one quarter decreases the current job-to-unemployment transition intensity
by 12% for men and 6% for women. For women, but not for men, this also decreases
the job-to-job transitions by 4%. These ﬁndings suggest that throughout a job spell
workers accumulate both speciﬁc and general skills. These factors roughly balance
out in determining the speed at which a subsequent job is found. However, once the
transition to a new job has been made, it is the impact related to the accumulation of
general skills that dominates.
32For women it does last longer, but only at a signiﬁcance level of 10%. The point estimates of lnc2
eu
for men are instead equal to -0.005 and not signiﬁcant.
33These ﬁgures are obtained from the point estimates of lnc3
eu reported in column (5) of Table 3.
184.3 Summary and the Stepping Stone Hypothesis
In a similar study on Australian youth, Doiron and Gørgens (2008) ﬁnd evidence
for occurrence dependence, but not for lagged duration dependence. An additional
spell of employment (unemployment) increases the probability of being employed
(unemployed) in the future and the size of these effects are of similar magnitude. In
this study we broadly ﬁnd that the direction of these lagged occurrence dependence
effects are also present, but that the positive impact of past employment is larger in
magnitude than that of past unemployment: an experience of unemployment in the
past makes a transition to unemployment more likely, whereas the past occupation of
a job both boosts the hiring rate and reduces the chances of being ﬁred from a job.
For Belgian disadvantaged youth it is not only the occurrence of past labour mar-
ket states that matters. In addition, both lagged unemployment duration and lagged
job tenure modestly inﬂuence current transition intensities. This suggests that, in con-
trast to the Australian labour market, the time spent in labour market states plays a
role. Consequently, the depreciation and accumulation of human capital during, re-
spectively, unemployment and employment cannot be discarded as explanatory factors
of the labour market transitions realized by Belgian youth.
With regard to the stepping stone hypothesis of short-lived jobs, we ﬁnd contrast-
ing forces, some supporting and some negating it. On the one hand, the pattern of
lagged duration dependence negates it. By accepting a short-lived job the worker in-
deed forgoes the opportunity of improving the job match by extending job search: the
longer one has been unemployed in the past, the more likely that the current job lasts
longer.
On the other hand, the baseline transition intensity from unemployment to em-
ployment exhibits clear negative current duration dependence (see Figure 1). Conse-
quently, by currently rejecting a short-lived job offer, the worker reduces her chances
of ﬁnding a job later on. In addition and more importantly, past job experiences boost
quite dramatically the job ﬁnding rate in the subsequent unemployment spells. This
effect increases with the number of labour market experiences, but at a decreasing
rate. This suggests that for youth the conversion rate to a long-lasting job crucially
depends on the speed at which one acquires the ﬁrst work experience. However, our
ﬁndings also suggest that, in line with those of Gagliarducci (2005) and García Pérez
and Muñoz-Bullón (2007), once this ﬁrst work experience has been acquired, the step-
ping stone effect decreases with the number of job experiences and job interruptions.
The observation period in this study is, however, too short to verify whether there
exists a threshold number of work experience beyond which short-lived jobs are no
longer springboards to long-lasting jobs.
194.4 Other Coefﬁcients
Finally, webrieﬂycommentontheestimatedcoefﬁcientsoftheotherexplanatoryvari-
ables reported in Tables A-5 and A-7 in Internet Appendix A-3. First, the estimated
coefﬁcients of most of the observed explanatory variables are in line with expecta-
tions. The only dissonance concerns the impact of the UB. For men the level of UB
has, as expected, a large and signiﬁcantly negative impact on the transition rate from
unemployment to employment. However, for women this impact is large and signif-
icantly positive. To understand this, we need to recall our discussion in Section 2,
where we explained that this coefﬁcient is only identiﬁed on the basis of those young
workers who have acquired a sufﬁciently long (more than one year) work experience
during the observation period. A second point is that the empirical analysis does not
control for the wages earned by these workers. Since the level of UB is (within a
range) proportional to past wages, a higher level of UB may also reﬂect a higher past
wage and, consequently, a higher productivity. This may explain the counterintuitive
ﬁnding for women. With regards to the anticipation effect of the drop in the UB level,
we do not ﬁnd clear evidence in line with the theory, but this can be due to the fact
that these effects are identiﬁed on a relatively small population: the coefﬁcients are
unstable and measured with little precision.
Second, the estimated probability masses and the location of each mass point sug-
gestanimportantdiversityintheimpactofunobservedcharacteristicsonthetransition
intensities. The discrete distributionfunction of therandom variable v is foundto have
4 probability masses for men and 5 for women.
5 Simulations
The parameter estimates discussed in the previous section did not allow us to formu-
late a deﬁnite conclusion on our main research question: are short-lived jobs stepping
stones to long-lived jobs? In this section we provide an answer and a quantiﬁcation
of the effect on the basis of simulations. The reliability of these simulations crucially
depends on the capacity of our event history model to predict the realized labour mar-
ket transition of the individuals retained in the sample. That is why, in a ﬁrst step,
we check the goodness-of-ﬁt of our model. In a second step, we will formulate more
precisely the object of evaluation. Finally, we present the simulation results regarding
the central research question of this study.
5.1 Goodness-of-Fit
To construct goodness-of-ﬁt statistics of the model, we use the parameter estimates to
simulate 999 labour market histories for each individual in the sample. Replicating
20the simulation 999 times allows us to construct empirical 95% conﬁdence intervals on
the empirical distribution of the duration in each labour market state (u or e) and of
the transitions to the possible destination states (u, e or a). The goodness-of-ﬁt can
then easily be checked by verifying whether the observed frequencies lie within the
conﬁdence intervals of the simulated ones.
Asaconsequenceofstocksamplingandtime-varyingexplanatoryvariables, which
can be state speciﬁc, such as the ﬁrm characteristics, the simulation involves a number
of complications. In Internet Appendix A-2 we discuss how these complications are
addressed and list the steps involved in the simulation procedure.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 4 contrasts the actual unemployment and job duration fre-
quencies with the simulated counterparts and reports simulated conﬁdence intervals.
The model ﬁts very well the observed frequencies of the duration distributions, in
particular for women. For men, the model tends to slightly overpredict short unem-
ployment spells and slightly underpredict long ones.
The second panel of Table 4 reports the ﬁt with respect to the destination states.
The model performs less, but still reasonably well, in predicting the fractions entering
a particular destination state. The job-to-job transitions are somewhat overpredicted
and job-to-unemployment transitions underpredicted, but again the size of the mis-
alignment is not so large.
Finally, the third panel of Table 4 clariﬁes that the model performs extremely well
in predicting, for those individuals who undertook a short-lived job as a way out of
the ﬁrst unemployment spell, the probabilities of ﬁnding a long-lasting job within 2
to 8 quarters after the short-lived job. In other words, the model perfectly ﬁts those
statistics which the evaluation analysis of the next subsections is based on.
5.2 The Object of Evaluation
The central question of this paper is whether a short-lived job might be a stepping
stone to more job security or, in contrast, trap young disadvantaged workers in a cycle
betweendead-endjobsandunemployment. Ashort-livedjobisdeﬁnedasajoblasting
at most one quarter and involuntarily ending in unemployment.34 As explained in the
Introduction, we exclude longer spells and jobs ending by a transition to another job as
to provide a lower bound to the stepping stone effect of a short-term job. Job security
is attained if a worker enters a long-lasting job enduring at least four quarters.
One may argue that the measure of job security is arbitrary. We justify this choice
by the observation that the bulk of the dismissals occurs during the ﬁrst year (see
Figure 1). Nevertheless, we agree that some sensitivity analysis with regards this
threshold makes sense. Since the exit rate from a job exhibits a peak in the fourth
quarter, we test whether our ﬁndings are sensitive to setting the threshold at 5 quarters.
34Weidentifytheinterruptionofthejobasinvoluntarywhenthejobendsin(insured)unemployment.
21Table 4: Simulated and Actual Distributions of Durations and Transitions
Men Women
Actual Simulated 95% conﬁdence Actual Simulated 95% conﬁdence
frequency frequency interval frequency frequency interval
Quarters Unemployment duration
1 .110 .129 .113 .144 .111 .108 .098 .119
2 .052 .054 .046 .062 .048 .047 .041 .053
3 .033 .028 .023 .035 .030 .029 .024 .034
4 .126 .138 .128 .148 .120 .125 .116 .134
5 .178 .182 .171 .194 .166 .169 .159 .179
6 .115 .113 .104 .123 .111 .113 .105 .123
7 .075 .071 .064 .079 .077 .077 .070 .084
8-9 .109 .104 .095 .114 .107 .106 .098 .114
10-12 .087 .081 .073 .089 .090 .090 .083 .097
13-19 .116 .099 .089 .110 .140 .137 .126 .146
Job tenure
1 .384 .394 .369 .421 .374 .384 .366 .401
2 .169 .178 .165 .190 .166 .166 .155 .178
3 .095 .096 .086 .105 .095 .094 .085 .103
4 .086 .086 .076 .095 .091 .087 .079 .095
5-6 .081 .079 .070 .088 .087 .084 .076 .092
7-9 .094 .083 .074 .093 .090 .088 .080 .096
10-15 .090 .086 .072 .100 .097 .097 .088 .107
Transitions Transitions from unemployment
(u;e) .595 .629 .594 .654 .524 .518 .499 .535
(u;a) .302 .296 .272 .336 .371 .377 .361 .399
Right cens. .103 .075 .066 .086 .106 .105 .096 .113
Transitions from employment
(e;e) .282 .346 .315 .385 .276 .301 .282 .321
(e;u) .319 .279 .255 .304 .335 .332 .312 .352
(e;a) .150 .146 .128 .166 .134 .133 .116 .148
Right cens. .249 .228 .206 .249 .256 .235 .222 .248
Time elapsed since
short-lived job Probability of having found a long-lasting job after a short-lived job(a)
2 quarters .114 .119 .099 .139 .140 .140 .123 .161
3 quarters .197 .214 .186 .241 .211 .234 .212 .266
4 quarters .269 .299 .268 .334 .299 .328 .298 .363
5 quarters .374 .377 .336 .415 .387 .401 .369 .438
6 quarters .452 .445 .398 .480 .455 .466 .430 .503
7 quarters .497 .502 .453 .538 .539 .520 .483 .558
8 quarters .536 .551 .494 .592 .589 .567 .527 .604
Notes: Actual frequencies lying in the 95% conﬁdence interval of the simulated frequencies are in bold.
(a) These are probabilities of having already found a long-lasting job 2 to 8 quarters after entering a short-lived job at
the end of the ﬁrst unemployment spell. Moreover, they are conditional on having entered a short-lived job within
7 quarters after graduation and on not being endogenously censored yet in the evaluation quarter. The reasons for
this conditioning set is clariﬁed in Subsection 5.2.
22We conclude that this hardly affects the ﬁndings.35 Further sensitivity analysis in
which the threshold is set much higher is not feasible with the available data. This
requires a longer observation period.
Formally, we are interested in the causal impact of a binary treatment, being hired
in a short-lived job, that is assigned in some quarter s 2 N0  f1;2;:::g during the
ﬁrst unemployment spell experienced after leaving school or not assigned at all, which
is represented as a treatment at inﬁnity (s = 1).36 The latter treatment corresponds
to a strategy in which one rejects all the short-lived jobs as a way out of the ﬁrst
unemployment spell. The set of mutually exclusive treatments can thus be denoted by
 N0  N0[f1g. In principle, the outcome variable of interest is the potential duration
T 
l (s) 2 N0 from graduation until entry in a long-lasting job that would realize if the
treatment is assigned in quarter s. The actual treatment is assigned according to a  N0-
valued random variable S and the actual outcome is Tl  T 
l (S); all other outcomes
are counterfactual.
Now consider a sample of individuals i with i = 1;2;:::I and assume that we ob-
serve for each of these individuals j = 1;2;:::J labour market histories. In the data we
observe only one labour market history (J = 1) for each individual. However, in the
simulations we can construct a large number of labour market histories for any given
individual, since these are identiﬁed in the model through the given time proﬁle of the
observed individual characteristics together with a given draw from the of unobserved
heterogeneity distribution associated to an individual. As shown below, this allows
us to simulate average treatment effects at the individual level and, consequently, the
distribution of the treatment effect.37
The realized potential outcomes and treatments for a particular labour market his-
tory j associated to individual i can then be denoted by Tlij  T 
lij(Sij) and Sij,
respectively. All other outcomes are counterfactual, in particular the counterfactual of
interest T 











; for i = 1;:::;I; (6)
wheretheconditionalexpectationistakenovertheJ simulatedlabourmarkethistories
of each sampled individual i who is eventually treated (Sij < 1).
In practice, this AITT cannot be identiﬁed, since it requires an observation window
of inﬁnite length. The observation window is limited by two forms of censoring. First,
there is the exogenous censoring induced by the data gathering. We start observing
35See panel (b) of Table A-9 in Internet Appendix A-3.
36The notation in this section is inspired by the one in Abbring and van den Berg (2003b).
37Note however that the treatment effect depends on observables and unobservables which enter the
labour market transition intensities in a proportional fashion.
23the school-leavers without any work experience only from their fourth quarter of un-
employment onwards. In addition, the labour market trajectory is right censored at the
end of 2001, after maximum 16 quarters. Second, there is the endogenous censoring
in the absorbing state a imposed on the econometric model for technical reasons.
In order to face these censoring problems, we propose an alternative outcome vari-
able and we alter the conditioning set of the AITT. We will label this new statistic the
conditional average individual treatment effect of the treated (CAITT). The new coun-
terfactual outcome variable is a binary indicator equal to one if an individual ﬁnds a
long-lasting job within d quarters from the moment s at which (s)he is assigned to the
treatment and zero otherwise:38
Y

d (s) = 1(T

l  s + d): (7)
If we denote by T 
a(s) the counterfactual duration, realized if the treatment is assigned
in quarter s, from graduation to entry in the endogenous censoring state a, we can







l (s);s + d)]: (8)
There is no censoring if state a is entered after being hired in a long-lasting job or
more than d quarters after entering a short-lived job.
The CAITT is then deﬁned as








dij(Sij) = 0;5  Sij  m

; (9)
for d = 1;:::;D, i = 1;:::;I. In words, the CAITT measures the increase in percent-
age points of individual i’s probability of ﬁnding a long-lasting job within d quarters
after entering a short-lived job compared to the counterfactual in which all short-lived
jobs are rejected. In order to cope with the censoring problem, the CAITT is condi-
tional on not being endogenously censored yet in the evaluation period and on having
entered a short-lived job between the start of the observation window (4 quarters after
graduation) and m quarters after graduation. m and D are chosen such that their sum
does not exceed 15, the width of the observation window (16) reduced by the length
of the long-lasting job (4) and augmented by 3 to take into account that m is measured
from graduation and not from the start of the observation period. In the baseline simu-
lation we set m = 7 and D = 8.39 Observe that the CAITT and the AITT are related in
the following way: if one sums the CAITT over d from one to inﬁnity in the absence
of censoring, then one obtains the AITT. Finally, note that from each CAITT we can
38In other words, d is the time elapsed since treatment at which the evaluation is carried out.
39In a sensitivity analysis reported in panel (a) of Table A-9 (Internet Appendix A-3), we set m = 11
and D = 4. Very similar results as in the baseline simulation are obtained.
24also estimate a CATT by averaging the CAITTs over the retained treated population:





5.3 The Simulation Results
The simulation procedure is described in Internet Appendix A-2. Table 5 reports
means and selected percentiles of the CAITT distributions for m = 7 and d = 2;4;8.
These results show that, in very short-run, short-lived jobs are not stepping stones.
Half a year after the transition to a short-lived job, the probability of having entered a
long-lasting job is 1 percentage point (but not signiﬁcantly) lower than if one would
have rejected the short-lived job. However, after one year the stepping stone effect
clearly emerges: the CATT is 5.2 percentage points for both men and women. After
two years the CATT increases further to (9.5) 13.4 percentage points for (wo)men.
Apparently, the stepping stone effect is more present among men than women.
Even if there is a clear stepping stone effect of short-lived jobs, the simulations
also demonstrate (see Table 5 or Figure 2) that there is substantial heterogeneity in
the treatment effect. The CAITT distributions reveal that, even if the CAITTs are
positive for the majority of the treated population, for roughly 40% of the treated the
transition to a short-lived job decreased the likelihood of entering a long-lasting job.
We can also deduce from the ﬁgures that the fraction of the population that beneﬁts
from the treatment remains roughly constant with the elapsed duration d since the start
of the treatment. The average effect increases with d because the size of the negative
CAITTs decreases and the size of the positive CAITTs increases.
In order to understand the possible sources of heterogeneity in the treatment effect,
we performed anOLS regressionof theCAITTs onthe observedand unobservedchar-
acteristics ﬁxed at the beginning of the observation period.40 We ﬁnd that the stepping
stone effect is less important for youth with higher education, living in Flanders and
in districts with a lower unemployment rate. We also tried to identify subpopulations
for whom short-lived jobs are not stepping stones on average. However, we could not
identify such a population on the basis of any combination of observed characteristics.
These results are in line with other European studies which generally ﬁnd that
short-term jobs are stepping stones to permanent jobs. We believe, however, that our
ﬁndings are even stronger, since we ﬁnd evidence of a stepping stone effect even for
unsuccessful jobs involuntarily ending in unemployment after maximum one quarter.
This claim is conﬁrmed in a sensitivity analysis in which we include, in the group
of the treated, also workers who make a job-to-job transition at the end of a job last-
40The estimation results with ~ 8i(7) as dependent variable are reported in Table A-10 in Internet
Appendix A-3. Even if almost all the coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant, their order of magnitude is
small.
25Table 5: Simulated CAITT Distributions for m = 7 and d =
2;4;8
Distribution of ~ 2i(7) Distribution of ~ 4i(7) Distribution of ~ 8i(7)
Statistics Mean 95% conf int Mean 95% conf int Mean 95% conf int
Men
CATT -.011 -.036 .016 .052 .019 .084 .134 .072 .186
(119.) (.299) (.551)
Selected percentiles of the CAITT distributions
Minimum -.587 -.700 -.490 -.464 -.580 -.380 -.348 -.480 -.260
5th -.386 -.445 -.330 -.288 -.334 -.240 -.188 -.231 -.150
10th -.317 -.370 -.260 -.237 -.280 -.190 -.143 -.180 -.101
25th -.169 -.243 .000 -.140 -.180 -.092 -.067 -.100 -.020
50th .048 .030 .070 .027 -.030 .070 .032 -.010 .070
75th .123 .100 .150 .223 .180 .280 .215 .140 .290
90th .195 .170 .240 .389 .340 .444 .504 .376 .622
95th .243 .210 .290 .471 .414 .538 .666 .560 .770
Maximum .429 .320 .550 .719 .600 .830 .909 .810 .980
# obs(a) 384.5 332.4 261.0
Women
CATT -.010 -.036 .014 .052 .020 .085 .095 .063 .142
(.140) (.328) (.567)
Selected percentiles of the CAITT distributions
Minimum -.583 -.680 -.490 -.489 -.610 -.400 -.396 -.530 -.300
5th -.398 -.350 -.440 -.289 -.340 -.249 -.199 -.246 -.150
10th -.328 -.370 -.270 -.234 -.270 -.200 -.147 -.200 -.110
25th -.170 -.240 -.103 -.138 -.180 -.100 -.069 -.100 -.040
50th .033 .020 .050 .028 -.020 .060 .021 -.010 .060
75th .129 .100 .160 .203 .155 .268 .187 .140 .250
90th .224 .190 .260 .419 .376 .472 .497 .374 .640
95th .285 .250 .339 .509 .447 .563 .670 .586 .749
Maximum .507 .370 .840 .724 .640 .890 .913 .840 .970
# obs(a) 501.7 425.6 330.4
Notes: In parentheses we report the average probability of having entered a long-lasting job
d quarters after a short-lived job, conditional on not being endogenously censored yet in the
evaluation period and on having entered a short-lived job between the start of the observation
window (4 quarters after graduation) and m quarters after graduation. Formally, it is the




dij(Sij) = 0;5  Sij  7]
	
.
(a) It indicates the average number of individuals satisfying the conditioning set in (9), i.e. the
average number of treated individuals.
26Figure 2: Simulated CAITT Distributions for m = 7 and d = 2;4;8
ing maximum one quarter.41 Two years after the start of the treatment, the CATT
increases to (13.6) 19.3 percentage points for (wo)men an increase by more than 40%
as compared to the benchmark treatment deﬁnition.42
Finally, up to now we only considered the treatment effect on the treated. It is
likely that providing a short-lived job to individuals who would otherwise have not
accepted such a job might generate a lower stepping stone effect: these individuals
might have rejected short-lived jobs because they knew they would be harmed by
accepting such jobs. We cannot however directly check this hypothesis, since we do
not observe whether workers have rejected such jobs: workers who did not accept
a short-lived job may have never received an offer. However, if this hypothesis is
correct, weshouldﬁndthatimposingthetreatmentonthosewhoarenottreatedshould
41In other words, the treated are now those that exit the post-school unemployment event through
a job lasting maximum one quarter, independently on whether this job ends in unemployment or in
another job.
42By looking at Table 3, one can understand which factor reinforces the stepping stone effect. It was
indeed found that a jobs that starts from a another job is longer-lasting than a comparable job that starts
from unemployment. For more details about the CAITT distributions under this different deﬁnition of
treatment, see Table A-11 and Figure A-3 in Internet Appendix A-3.
27reducethesteppingstoneeffect. Thisisconﬁrmedbyasimulationinwhichweimpose
a job lasting one quarter (ending in a job-to-job transition or in unemployment) on all
the individuals who are still unemployed after one year since graduation. Two years
after this imposed job, the probability of having entered a long-lasting job increases by
(7) 17 percentage points for (wo)men.43 As compared to the simulations in which no
such jobs are imposed, the reduction of the treatment effect is especially important for
women, since it is nearly halved. The reader should be careful in not interpreting these
last ﬁndings as the expected impact of a policy in which all long-term unemployed
workers would be offered a short-lived job. The reason is that such a large scale policy
would presumably generate general equilibrium effects, which cannot be captured by
our model. For instance, if the stepping stone effect is generated by signaling, then
this policy would make the signal less reliable, meaning that employers may no longer
use it in their hiring decisions.
6 Conclusions
Can short-lived jobs (lasting less than one quarter and involuntarily ending in unem-
ployment) be stepping stones to long-lasting jobs (lasting more than one year) for
disadvantaged youth? This was the central question of this research. To answer this
question the analysis proceeded in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, a dynamic multi-state
multi-spell model of labour market trajectories of Belgian long-term unemployed
school-leavers was estimated using administrative data gathered between 1998 and
2001. On the basis of the estimation results of this model and by way of simulations,
in a second step we carried out an a posteriori analysis. It quantiﬁes the effect of
accepting short-lived jobs as a way out of the post-school unemployment event, as
opposed to rejecting them and waiting for a better job.
The model in the ﬁrst step provides evidence on the presence of lagged occurrence
and lagged duration dependence in the labour market experience of Belgian disadvan-
taged youth. This issue has hardly been investigated in the past. In a study on Aus-
tralian youth Doiron and Gørgens (2008) ﬁnd evidence for lagged occurrence depen-
dence, but not for lagged duration dependence. In contrast, we ﬁnd evidence for both
lagged occurrence and lagged duration dependence. In addition, we ﬁnd for Belgian
youth a positive impact of the occurrence of past employment on subsequent employ-
ment which is larger than that of past unemployment on subsequent unemployment.
For Australian youth these impacts were broadly the same. This implies that for Bel-
gian youth there are more long lasting positive impacts from employment, irrespective
of its duration, than there are negative impacts from unemployment. These factors,
amongst others, support the stepping stone hypothesis. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd some
43For more details, see Table A-12 and Figure A-4 in Internet Appendix A-3.
28evidence against the stepping stone hypothesis. The pattern of lagged duration depen-
dence suggests that it could not be a good idea to accept a job too quickly, since de-
laying exit from unemployment may improve the stability of the post-unemployment
job (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999).
The simulation results reveal that the factors in favour of the stepping stone hy-
pothesis dominate. By accepting short-lived jobs, rather than rejecting them as a way
out of the ﬁrst unemployment spell after graduation, the probability of entering a long-
lasting job is, within two years, enhanced by (9.5) 13.4 percentage points for (wo)men.
Moreover, we claim that this effect is a lower bound, since we restricted the analysis to
very short-lived jobs (lasting no longer than one quarter) that are unsuccessful in that
they involuntarily end in unemployment rather than in another job. On the other hand,
the simulations indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity in the effect. Roughly,
40 percent of those who accepted short-lived jobs would have speeded up their labour
market integration by rejecting those jobs. The stepping stone effect was found to be
smaller for certain subpopulations: the higher educated youth, those living in Flanders
and in districts with low unemployment rates. However, we were not able to identify,
on the basis of observed characteristics, any subpopulation for which short-lived jobs
prove to be dead-end jobs on average.
These ﬁndings need to be qualiﬁed for a number of reasons. First, the strategy of
accepting short-lived jobs may have less beneﬁcial long-run consequences on other
dimensions of the quality of a job, such as on the level of wages. Second, as men-
tioned in Subsection 4.2, our ﬁndings also suggest, in line with those of Gagliarducci
(2005) and García Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2007), that, once a ﬁrst work experience
has been acquired, the stepping stone effect may be less important or even disappear.
Thirdly, in our simulation we estimated the treatment effect on the treated. This step-
ping stone effect cannot be extrapolated from the non-treated population. As a matter
of fact, those who rejected short-lived jobs may have done so because they knew they
would be harmed. In a sensitivity analysis in which we imposed a short-lived job on
all long-term unemployed youth, we indeed ﬁnd a smaller stepping stone effect than
the one on the treated population only, especially for women. Finally, if the stepping
stoneeffectisgeneratedbysignalinghigherproductivityormotivation, whichislikely
if we restrict our attention to short-term employment,44 then policies stimulating the
transition to short-term jobs might not generate the positive effects we report here. By
doing so, the signal may indeed become less reliable, meaning that employers may no
longer use it in their hiring decisions.
44Other mechanisms, such as those related to the accumulation of human capital, take more time.
29Appendix
A-1 Deriving the Likelihood Function
In this appendix we specify the contribution to the likelihood function of a completed spell
s whose origin state is j. Suppose that after a sojourn of ts quarters in the origin state j, a
transition to the destination state k is observed, with (j;k) 2 Z . Denote Djk an indicator
variable equal to 1 if a (j;k) transition is observed and 0 otherwise. We now suppress the set
of observed and unobserved characteristics, but in what follows we are implicitly conditioning
on them.
The contribution to the likelihood function is the unconditional probability of jointly ob-
serving the departure from j and the transition to k after a sojourn of ts quarters in the origin
state j, i.e. Pr(ts   1  Tj < ts;Djk = 1). Since we have quarterly information, we do not
exactly know when the transition occurs within two consecutive quarters and the best that can
be done is to model the probability of observing the departure within two consecutive quarters.
This probability can be rewritten as
Pr(Tj  ts   1)Pr(ts   1  Tj < ts;Djk = 1jTj  ts   1) (A-1)
which is the product of the survivor function and of a conditional probability.


































where J = E if j = e and J = U if j = u. We assume now that the transition intensities
are constant within two consecutive quarters, since we do not have information on what hap-
pens within each interval. Under this assumption, we can specify the discrete time process as
a continuous time model and the hazard functions can be taken out of the integrals, yielding
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30The conditional probability in (A-1) can be written as























and exploiting again the assumption that the transition intensities are constant within two con-

















Multiplying (A-2) by (A-4) and reintroducing the set of observed and observed characteristics
yield equation (3), which is the contribution to the likelihood function of a complete spell s
for j 2 fu;eg.
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